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Brian Stiltner

Sacred Heart University, stiltnerb@sacredheart.edu

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Challenge of Ethical Political Leadership

BRIAN STILTNER

Sadly, there seems to be a never-ending parade of news stories to confirm the widespread impression that politicians are ethically flawed. The first few years of the 2000s have brought devastating blows to the public's confidence in the moral quality of Connecticut's public leaders. In 2003 alone, Bridgeport Mayor Joseph P. Ganim was imprisoned for corruption, Waterbury Mayor Philip Giordano was imprisoned for child sexual abuse, and Governor John G. Rowland admitted he lied about gifts he received from state contractors, leading to his resignation from office on July 1, 2004. This was followed by a guilty plea in federal court and subsequent incarceration in federal prison. Corruption and ethical violations by public officials have occurred at all levels of state government and in both political parties. Is Connecticut in serious ethical trouble? One might take heart from a recent report by the *Corporate Crime Reporter* that ranked states according to corruption convictions of public officials. Connecticut was thirty-first on the list, fortunately far removed by this data from the "most corrupt" states of Mississippi, North Dakota, and Louisiana, but not as clean as our neighbor, New Hampshire, in forty-seventh place.¹ But even the lowest ranking on this scale would give a state no excuse to rest on its laurels, for politics is called to a higher goal. Something more profound than reputation is at stake: the vitality of our state political system. Connecticut can ill-afford the erosion of public confidence in executives,

legislators, and career public servants that results from continuous scandals.

Without a solid ethical foundation to state governance, the process of developing and implementing sound public policy is weakened. The scandal-ridden official loses credibility with colleagues and the public, hampering his or her effectiveness. More seriously, a flurry of political scandals and convictions may turn voters away from politics in disgust, a state of affairs that can only undermine the quality of the policymaking process. It would be a shame if Connecticut's high level of voter registration and voter turnout were to sink toward mediocrity.² In addition to the crisis of public confidence, ethical abuses foster systemic and long-lasting harms to state politics. Public resources are misdirected to the well-connected few instead of being efficiently used for the good of all citizens. For example, former Governor Rowland, even after admitting that he lied about receiving gifts and renovations for his vacation cottage worth tens of thousands of dollars, maintained throughout the crisis that he did not violate state law, because he did not influence public policy or direct public funds to benefit the gift-givers. Yet among these gift-givers were members of the Tomasso family, owners of several contracting companies that have received millions of dollars in state contracts.³ The Tomassos were significant contributors to Rowland's campaigns and to the Republican Governor's Association when it was chaired by Rowland.⁴ Whatever Rowland may believe about his intentions in this case, it strains credibility to claim that contractors who give gifts to high-placed public officials do so with no expectation of return and to claim that the officials are not influenced by their personal stake in the relationship. Even if Rowland sincerely believed that he gave no special consideration to these gift-givers, the conflict of interest is highly unethical and may well be proven illegal in due course.

The Rowland scandal, like many others, demonstrates that the personal and the systemic challenges for political ethics are two sides of the same coin. Very often, the causative factors of a politician's misdeeds are not only personal: they had not only to do with his or her character, but with systematic features of the electoral system and structure of American politics. This system

requires candidates for statewide and national office to raise large sums of money in order to compete effectively; candidates and parties turn to wealthy donors and to interest groups that can pool large amounts of cash. Ever aware of the next election, candidates and their parties feel beholden to this money. Once in office, legislators write laws that maintain the advantages of incumbency, and officials enjoy perquisites not available to the general public. In this context, individual politicians can still be virtuous, but some start engaging in questionable behavior, while others blatantly abuse their power. Even worse, many ethically questionable practices—such as those having to do with fundraising and political advertising—are pervasive and legal. These practices are the most difficult to bring under ethical control, because many politicians do not even see the problem. They are just going along with the political game as they find it. My fundamental assumption in this chapter is that both the personal and the systemic dimensions of political ethics must be addressed. Too many politicians and pundits assume that the challenge is *either* character promotion *or* political reform, but wisdom lies in realizing that it is *both*.

Four convictions shape my recommendations in this chapter—none of them very sensational, but all of them essential when considering the ethical dimension of politics. First, public officials should be persons of the highest ethical character who monitor their own behavior. Nothing can replace the role of character and vigilance over one's own actions. Second, citizens have the right to expect and demand ethical behavior from their officials. The public should not accept rationalizations from politicians or commentators that are based on a legalistic mindset or a false distinction between public and private spheres. Third, ethics laws and codes can set valuable boundaries in which public officials should act, but these regulations can only do so much. Ethics laws do their job best when they are bolstered by an active, independent, well-funded oversight commission and when there are procedures for proactive promotion of ethical behavior and not simply retroactive punishment of unethical behavior. Fourth, seeds of hope may be found both in policy reforms to promote good governance and in the work of institutions in civil society.

The sensational scandals are not the whole reality of politics. I believe that the majority of elected officials in Connecticut are committed public servants with records of high integrity. I doubt that any reader of this chapter, even one quite critical of the integrity of the political system, can fail to think of a current official serving at any level of government whom they consider a person of integrity. If each of us can think of such role models in politics, then we can ask: How do we promote that kind of leadership? What kind of environment—political, legal, and cultural—best nurtures leaders to act ethically and for the common good?

Connecticut Ethics Laws and their Violation

In the years just after the Watergate scandal, the federal government and many states strengthened their ethics laws. Connecticut followed suit: in 1977, Public Act 77-600 created the Code of Ethics for Public Officials and the Code of Ethics for Lobbyists.⁵ The basic requirement for public officials and state employees is that they not use their office for financial gain to themselves, their immediate family, or business interests with which they are involved. Among many other specifications, the law stipulates that officials refrain from acting upon matters in which they have a financial conflict of interest and that businesses with which they are associated not enter into contracts with the state except through an open and public process. Legislators, public officials, and state employees may not receive any gift from a lobbyist or a person or entity doing business with the state, except food and gifts of nominal value under very limited circumstances. Legislators, public officials, and certain high-level employees must file annual financial statements that specify the official's sources of income, properties, blind trusts, securities, creditors, and associations with businesses.

The Code of Ethics outlaws obvious felonies: bribery, bid-rigging, witness tampering, and offering and receiving kickbacks. These activities have figured in recent scandals, often in connection with steering state contracts to insiders. A business may give an official a bribe in order to secure a state contract without a bid. Or a politically-connected consultant may pay a

“kickback” to an official, that is, a cut of the consultant’s fees as a reward to the official for steering the contract to the consultant’s client. For example, Governor Rowland’s former deputy chief of staff Lawrence E. Alibozek pled guilty to taking bribes (March 2003), former State Treasurer Paul Silvester pled guilty to taking kickbacks (September 1999), and Rowland’s former co-chief of staff Peter N. Ellef remains under federal investigation for a plethora of financial misdeeds.

In order to supervise compliance with these laws, the General Assembly created the State Ethics Commission. The Ethics Commission is a seven-member citizen panel (soon to be increased to nine) whose members are balanced in terms of party membership and are appointed by the governor and other legislative leaders. The Commission employs an executive director/general counsel and six staffers, soon to be increased to nine staffers.⁶ The Commission can render advisory opinions, levy civil fines for violations of the ethics laws, and refer suspected felonies to the Attorney General. Clearly, the best way to deal with political ethics is to head-off unethical behavior before it happens. This is the role of the advisory opinion. The Ethics Commission is asked several times a year for its advice about the propriety of a certain arrangement (for example, if a legislator could receive a certain kind of memento as a gift from a lobbyist). The Commission applies the law to the case and tells the person who requested the advice whether they may engage in the action or not. Additionally, the Commission polices conflicts of interest by receiving and reviewing financial statements and reports of gifts that are allowed under the law. It registers and supervises the activities of lobbyists. (I must leave aside here the question of the ethics of lobbying: some condemn lobbying as a perverse force in the political process, while others see it as essential form of free speech. Given the reality of lobbying, it must be tightly regulated. See the last section of this chapter for further comments.)

The Ethics Commission issues dozens of advisory opinions per year. One can reasonably hope that many unethical activities have been avoided by this service. For those who do not bother to seek an opinion, the Commission has taken more than thirty enforcement actions since 1998 and has referred other matters to the

Attorney General for possible prosecution. For example, in 2003, the Commission required Governor Rowland to pay a \$2,000 fine for receiving concert tickets and another \$2,000 fine and almost \$7,000 in repayment to the state for accepting vacation lodging from state contractors.⁷ In early 2004, the Commission's Executive Staff assisted the legislative committee of inquiry into impeachment proceedings against Rowland. The Commission can also act against those who do not work for the government. The Commission has negotiated settlements with some consultants who engaged in illegal "contingent fee lobbying"—receiving a fee that is contingent upon the outcome of an official action. For lobbying the Office of the State Treasurer, St. James Associates, LLC, was required to repay approximately \$1.75 million in finders' fees and \$150,000 in legal fees to the state.⁸ It is hard to know whether thirty enforcement actions is a heartening or disheartening number, and it is probably too early to tell. One indication will be whether the number of enforcements goes down over a number of years—as long as the oversight remains just as vigorous. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the Commission is staffed and funded to a level that enables it to do its work effectively.

If one reads the ethics statutes of Connecticut, they appear detailed and comprehensive. Yet loopholes appear: sometimes unforeseen, sometimes because the General Assembly bowed to political pressures and kept the law weaker than it could be. Some holes are allowed in the statutes to relieve the bureaucratic burden of reporting and maintaining reports on negligible gifts; other holes are allowed in the name of preventing the government from intruding into the privacy of officials and citizens. For example, the law allows exceptions in gifts and financial interests as a concession to everyday realities; otherwise, the rationale goes, public officials would be burdened by constant reporting and the Commission would be buried in paperwork. But any exception that is reasonable on paper can be exploited. For instance, one gift exemption allows an official or state employee to receive a gift of substantial value as the celebration of a "major life event." The idea here is that the \$10 limit could be transgressed if a lobbyist or business interest gave an official/employee a more expensive

baby gift upon the birth of a child. In September 2003, Public Works Commissioner Theodore Anson was forced to resign for accepting architectural plans worth \$190,000 from a major state contractor. He has claimed that he did not violate the law because the plans were a gift in celebration of his adoption of three children.⁹ Clearly, this is a violation of the spirit of law. In this case, the loophole in the language of the law should be eliminated. Other obvious ambiguities should be removed so that a corrupt official has fewer places to hide. As much as possible, these arrangements should be brought into the open through "sunshine laws" that require disclosure of all gifts and financial conflicts of interest bearing upon a state employee's work. For some persons, only the prospect of being caught will provide enough disincentive to unethical behavior, so the civil and criminal penalties must be severe.

Ethical Expectations and Confusions

Yet no amount of laws and harsh penalties can make a politician a good person. For that, we must look elsewhere. It is really no mystery what is expected of leaders. Ethical leaders are virtuous and put the common good ahead of their personal interests. Twenty-six centuries ago, Confucius described the qualities of an ethical leader, describing "the superior person" as one who is guided by propriety, humility, and truthfulness; who listens to sage advice; who wins the respect of others by treating them respectfully. He said of such a person, "He whose wisdom brings him into power, needs Goodness to secure that power" (*Analects*, 15:32).¹⁰ The ancient Greek philosophers presented a similar list of virtues, encouraging people to develop the habit of balanced action—to be, for example, neither excessively rash nor timid, but to seek the balance of prudence and fortitude. In a modern idiom, it has been said that "an ethical person ought to do more than he's required to do and less than he's allowed to do."¹¹ This crucial dimension of ethics is called character, which is the overall set of virtues a person has, leading to trustworthy, honest, humble, integral behavior that surpasses the standards set by laws and rules. Character cannot be enforced, nor can it be imparted to a public official late in life. Character is shaped by

family upbringing and other educational influences. Influences are just that: they are not the final cause of character. In the end, character is developed by a person's self-reflection and striving to develop habits over a lifetime. To consider character requires us to look beyond the impact of laws, important though these are. Ethicists Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings note four "mutually reinforcing factors working to support the ethical integrity" of public officials: "informal moral traditions, formal ethics regulations, political incentives in the legislative process and the electoral system, and . . . legislators' own personal commitment to live up to their ethical obligations."¹² The first and fourth items are what we are talking about now. If we narrow our focus only to the second item, as is too commonly done, we skew our understanding of the causes of unethical behavior and of the required response.

Indeed, a narrow focus on acts and laws, at the expense of character, generates two confusions that stymie ethical reform. The first is legalism: the notion that as long as one stays within the bounds of existing law, one is being ethical, or at least "not doing anything wrong." This oft-invoked phrase is usually just a rationalization, but even when seriously offered, it is a cramped account of ethics. Even if a politician is steering a job to a friend and not asking for something in return, the politician is getting a psychological benefit at the public's expense. The expense to the public can be both tangible (taxpayers are paying the salary of someone who is not necessarily the best qualified and not every applicant had equal consideration) and more intangible but no less wrong (the symbolic value of fair and transparent government is eroded and such practices make a politician more likely to engage in future abuses). It is no excuse to a charge of ethical violation that no one was hurt by it. As ethicist Gilbert Meilaender affirms, people can be wronged even when they are not harmed.¹³

The second confusion concerns how to draw the line between the public and the private spheres. The line has shifted over time and it has always been contested. We should honor a line, but this does not mean that morality is irrelevant to governance, just that there are limitations in how we should hold officials accountable for unethical behavior. We should affirm that politics has a moral

foundation: its moral role is to promote the well-being of citizens and the nation's common good. Ethical behavior is a boon to leadership and citizens rightly expect their leaders to embody it. A system of accountability should be graduated: the more an official's behavior harms the common good, the more we as a society should seek restitution through political or legal means. This way of thinking about the matter honors the rough distinction we make between public and private morality, without our having to be sure where to draw a line, because in fact it is impossible to draw a firm line. And of course, people disagree about the meaning of the common good, so there's no easy way out of the woods. But framing the matter this way should keep us from falling into stale debates where conservatives charge liberals with moral relativism and liberals charge conservatives with legislating morality. Politics is inescapably about morality, but especially the morality of creating a good and just society that honors citizens' liberty, gives them assistance as they try to live well, and sustains their civic associations.

On this understanding of public morality, public officials should be persons of the highest ethical character, but they are not required to be saints. The ethical official makes mistakes, as Confucius said,¹⁴ but he corrects them as soon as he recognizes them—not when law enforcement officials are hot on his trail. I must say again that the expectations are no great mystery. The laws are a good guide, just not an exhaustive one, to the expected behavior. To read and apply the guide rightly, the official must consult his or her internal moral compass. And when in doubt, he or she should ask for advice. Giving advice, in fact, it is one of the functions of the State Ethics Commission.

What Can Be Done?

The ethical challenge is pervasive and touches on every aspect of public life. Bemōaning “human nature” or “the political system,” many throw up their hands. But there are things to be done that can improve the ethical climate of Connecticut politics. Moving to recommendations, I maintain my double focus on personal and systemic factors by suggesting five initiatives.

Tighten Ethics Laws

First, the General Assembly should undertake a comprehensive review of the ethics laws, including a comparison to other states and to federal law. The General Assembly should consider the following policy initiatives:

- Put more types of gifts in the forbidden, rather than the reportable, category.
- Tighten some language in the ethics laws to avoid subjective interpretations and loopholes such as the “major life event” gift exception.
- Strengthen confidentiality requirements. While these are not directly relevant to the recent scandals, they seem to be an underdeveloped aspect of the code of ethics.
- Put more restrictions on the use of consultants and other parties that attempt to negotiate financial arrangements between contractors and the state.
- Develop a code of ethics and regulations for state contractors. Businesses wanting state contracts should have internal mechanisms in place, such as an ethics code, ethics training, and a compliance process.
- Forbid a business from receiving future state contracts when it is found in violation of ethics laws. The business should also be required to go through a re-licensing process in order to become eligible again.
- Create “sunshine” provisions that require state contractors to report every gift that they give to politicians.
- Increase civil fines for violations.

In fact, in the wake of the Rowland scandal, the General Assembly passed several new laws in the spring of 2004.¹⁵ House Bill 5025 prohibits "any state or quasi-state public agency from executing a large state contract [over \$500,000] unless it and the contract recipient certify that there was no fraud or collusion and that gifts were not exchanged from the date the contract planning began to the date the contract was executed." Senate Bill 386 enacted changes to the State Code of Ethics: increasing the statute of limitations for filing complaints, giving the state more time to void a contract in violation of the code, increasing maximum civil penalties to \$10,000, and raising the criminal penalty for intentional violations from misdemeanor to felony status. House Bill 5021 increases certain penalties for Ethics Code violations, requires Connecticut Lottery Corporation employees to comply with the Ethics Code, and puts strictures on the use of legal defense funds for officials being charged with violations. In addition, Governor M. Jodi Rell, who took over Rowland's term, banned state employees from traveling with contractors or lobbyists to evaluate possible state projects.¹⁶ All of the above laws are welcome, but more work remains to be done.

Strengthen the State Ethics Commission

Second, the General Assembly should strengthen the hand of the Ethics Commission, primarily by increasing its staff and the funding for its activities. In recent years, Executive Director Alan S. Plofsky had complained that the Commission was financially strapped and could not fully investigate all complaints. The General Assembly should increase the size and funding of the Commission and see that it keeps pace with inflation. With Public Act 04-204, the General Assembly expanded the membership for the Commission by two, to a total of nine members, and protected its funding. In August 2004, Governor Rell authorized funding for three new staff positions for the Commission—an attorney, an accountant, and an investigator—and increased its budget.¹⁷

The General Assembly should also strengthen the immunity of the Commission and its staff from political pressure. An

example of pressure occurred in January 2004 during the Rowland crisis, when the chairwoman of the Commission ordered Executive Director Plofsky to withdraw a draft advisory opinion and not to answer questions in public, even generic ones, about the laws the governor stood accused of breaking. The *New Haven Advocate* was right to call this a “muzzling” with fearful implications.¹⁸ Whatever the intentions of the commissioners, the result played into the hands of the governor’s legal team. The General Assembly should carefully review the situation and act to protect the independence of the Commission. At the same time, it is incumbent upon all persons involved in ethical oversight to act with the utmost professionalism and discretion. Plofsky himself has been chided for his public criticism of Governor Rowland, and following an investigation into his conduct was discharged from office.¹⁹

Provide Public Financing of Election Campaigns

The third initiative is public financing of campaigns. The General Assembly has several times considered a bill to provide for public financing. Many observers consider this to be an absolutely essential step in preventing corruption in the electoral process. In scandal after scandal, it is clear that politicians, who need to raise large sums of money to win elections, seek the support of political action committees, lobbyists, businesses, and wealthy friends who do business with the state. It is only natural that these parties will seek a return on their investment, in the form of influence on policies and access to contracts. The pattern is clear: such a relationship is a temptation to misdeeds and an abuse of public trust. We should not have to wait until law enforcement catches someone paying a kickback in order to intervene. Even when there is no such direct remuneration, can the public feel confident when a company gives thousands of dollars to candidates and those candidates when later in office help steer contracts toward those companies? Is the public to believe that when a business political action committee or a labor union gives tens of thousands of dollars to candidates, their munificence has no bearing on the policies the candidates later promote? The

nexus between moneyed interests and public office must be broken. Legislators, when making law, should listen to constituents and all reasonable arguments, including those of interest groups, but those groups should not be financing the legislators' place in office. The same holds true with the executive branch. The specific shape of campaign finance reform is beyond my purview here, but I think only full public financing of statewide races will completely break the nexus. In any event, the day has come for campaign finance reform in Connecticut. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that there is the political will among the Democratic and Republican parties for substantial reform on this matter.

Establish Local Ethics Commissions

Fourth, the General Assembly should encourage the development of ethical oversight at the municipal level. According to a recent report by the Office of Legislative Research, only 48 of Connecticut's 169 cities and towns have an ethics commission.²⁰ Seventeen of these self-reported on the number of complaints that they hear. Their typical answer was that cases are infrequent: some towns said they have heard no cases, others said only one case every few years. Some towns also said they were "not sure." The rate and type of responses to this survey may be cause for concern. If towns rarely hear ethics complaints because there is nothing to complain about or the commission is newly founded, that is fine; however, when the town government does not know how many cases are heard, that suggests a lack of seriousness about the process. Obviously, there are limits to what the state government can do at the municipal level. The State Ethics Commission has already developed a model code of ethics for town governments, as it was charged to do so by the General Assembly in 1994. With more funding and staff, the State Ethics Commission could create a manual for towns on how to create and operate an ethics board and could sponsor a conference for representatives from all Connecticut town governments in order to promote best practices. (The Commission already sponsors a biennial one-day ethics conference for legislators.) This effort is

important because corruption also occurs on the municipal level and because the public's confidence in—or cynicism about—government in general is heavily influenced by local politics.

Responsibilities of Other Institutions

So far, I have canvassed four possibilities for policy reform, but another significant sphere requires attention. A large part of what we have to work on is the political culture of Connecticut, a diffuse but essential part of the problem and of the solution. Millions of citizens, tens of thousands of public and private institutions, and thousands of public officials take actions every day that shape the political culture. In such a complex and diffuse system, there are no simple guidelines for moving toward a goal such as "improving the ethical quality of politics." Nonetheless, we can lay out some basic priorities for those institutions that are leaders in shaping the state's political culture.

Nonprofit organizations and political interest groups that focus on good governance are always vital. Common Cause has been an important organization at the national scene and in Connecticut.²¹ Though this is difficult and often thankless work, we all benefit from critical oversight by these organizations. The same can be said of the press: the tenacious reporting of the *Hartford Courant* was critical in unearthing Governor Rowland's problematic connections for general public view. Independent newspapers, such as the *Advocate* group, are very important as well. Unfortunately not as many citizens read these papers as read mass distribution papers or see the local television news. The troubling tendency in the last few years has been for local media to be bought up by corporate conglomerates, a trend that has been widely lamented yet poorly regulated in law. Journalists must be vigilant about maintaining their independent voice and they must cover the background of these issues, not simply the scandals when they break.

Political parties should play a strong role in holding their officials and candidates to high standards. Both major parties have had their share of scandals; both need to resist the temptation to close ranks around an unethical official. It is heartening that

several prominent Republicans in Connecticut were willing to call for Governor Rowland's resignation. Certainly these politicians had the interests of their party at heart as well, but the very first to speak out against Rowland—six GOP state senators, and U.S. Representatives Rob Simmons and Christopher Shays—took a stance in advance of the Party and significantly increased the pressure on Rowland to resign.²² Unless this practice becomes typical and occurs early in the development of scandals, the public will remain cynical about the willingness of the parties to police themselves. Third parties in Connecticut have raised criticism of the major parties and provided an alternate route to political participation for disheartened voters. A Connecticut Party, founded in the early 1990s by Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., the Reform Party in the mid-1990s, and the Green Party in the early 2000s have elected some candidates to office, especially at the municipal level. But such efforts are typically short-lived. Whatever one thinks of the value of these parties, there can be little quarrel with encouraging some alternative perspectives and allowing voters to decide. Campaign finance reform would likely allow third-party candidates to receive a better hearing in statewide elections, and I think such competition will be to the good.

Lastly, we must note the crucial role played by the public itself, both the citizenry and various other social institutions, such as schools, universities, churches, social clubs, sports organizations, volunteer groups, and so on. These organizations do not often play a direct role in politics, other than communicating with officials or legislatures on policies that affect their interests. Some organizations, such as religious bodies, guide their members to express a unified voice on policy issues on a regular basis. Whether one agrees with the positions of these organizations, their promotion of civic engagement should be welcomed. All these groups are vital in the moral and civic education of children and in the ongoing formation of adult character. They would do well to reevaluate periodically the contributions they are making, or not making, to civic education.

As for citizens, does the old adage that "the people get the government they deserve" mean that Connecticut citizens deserved the scandals of the last few years? I think not. Indeed, the

basic ethical sensibility of the citizens was well expressed in its lack of tolerance for the violations of its officials.²³ The adage expresses a basic truth: We voters have a fundamental responsibility to elect upstanding candidates and to throw corrupt ones out of office. But when officials lie and hide their financial dealings, the public can hardly be blamed. That's why we need watertight laws, vigorous oversight, independent voices, and an electoral process that does not pervert the information voters receive. The responsibility of citizens in this moment includes not only voting their consciences but pressing their representatives to put the electoral process and policymaking on a cleaner, more transparent foundation. It is a complicated and audacious task, but one from which we must not shrink.

Notes

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1. Editorial, "Corruption Still Flourishes," *Boston Herald*, LexisNexis Academic database, 24 January 2004, p. 18. The report by the Washington D.C.-based legal newsletter based its rankings on the rate of convictions of officials for corruption from 1993 to 2002. Connecticut has 2.2 convictions per 100,000 residents. The full report is available online at www.corporatecrimereporter.com.

2. In the 2000 presidential elections, 58.4% of eligible voters in Connecticut turned out, and 77.9% of registered voters, ahead of the national averages of 51.3% and 67.5%. Turnout of registered voters in Connecticut was the third highest in the nation. See the Federal Election Commission statistics online at www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm.

3. Susan Haigh, "Rowland Says Others Helped Pay For Summer Home," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

4. Ken Dixon, "Rowland Accused of Gift-Jobs Link," *Connecticut Post*, LexisNexis Academic database, 25 September 2002.

5. The Codes of Ethics became Title 1, Chapter 10 of the *General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Revised to 2003*, vol. 1 (Hartford, Conn: State of Connecticut, 2003). It is also available at the State's website, www.cga.state.ct.us/2001/pub/Chap010.htm.

6. For information on the membership, responsibilities, and activities of the State Ethics Commission, consult its website at www.ethics.state.ct.us. Increases in the membership and staffing of the Commission are discussed later in this chapter.

7. Susan Haigh, "Rowland Pays \$9,000 to Settle Ethics Complaint," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

8. This and other cases are summarized by the State Ethics Commission, "Enforcement Actions (1998-Present)" at www.ethics.state.ct.us/Enforcement_Actions/enforcement_summaries.htm.

9. Susan Haigh, "Anson Steps Down After Admitting He Accepted Gifts," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

10. Arthur Waley, trans., *Confucianism: The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Quality Paperback Book Club, 1992), p. 199.

11. This quote has been attributed on the Internet to Michael Josephson, the director of an institute that promotes character formation and ethical leadership. But in a long list of famous quotes about ethics on Josephson's website, this quote is not to be found. See www.josephsoninstitute.org.

12. Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, "Ethics in the Legislative Process: An Overview" in Ann Marie Donahue, ed., *Ethics in Politics and Government*, The Reference Shelf, 61, no. 2 (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1989), p. 155.

13. Gilbert Meilaender, *Bioethics: A Primer for Christians* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), p. 5.

14. Waley, *Analects of Confucius*, 1:8.

15. The following summary is from Connecticut General Assembly, "2004 Major Public Acts," OLR Research Report, 7 May 2004; available at www.cga.state.ct.us/2004/rpt/2004-R-0411.htm.

16. Susan Haigh, "Rell Imposes Prohibition on Travel with Contractors," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

17. Christopher Keating, "Rell Hikes Ethics Budget; Allows Hires For Expanded Workload" *Hartford Courant*, August 13, 2004, p. B1.

18. Paul Bass, "Your Move, Plofsky," *New Haven Advocate*, January 22, 2004, p. 5.

19. "Report: Plofsky on Leave, Under Investigation," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

20. Sandra Norman-Eady, "Municipal Ethics," OLR Research Report, Connecticut General Assembly, December 22, 2003; available at www.cga.state.ct.us/2003/olrdata/gae/rpt/2003-R-0947.htm.

21. See its website at www.commoncause.org/states/test/default.cfm?state=CT.

22. Susan Haigh, "Shays, Senate Republicans Add Voices, Call for Rowland to Resign," *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database.

23. This intolerance obviously mounts over time as misdeeds are revealed, which proves again the need for a vigorous press. Just before his December 2, 2004, press conference at which he admitted that he lied about gifts, Governor Rowland received a 37% approval rating in a poll, with only the same percentage considering him honest and trustworthy ("Rowland Job Approval Up Slightly" *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic database). By late December, 55% of residents wanted Rowland to resign, and by June 3, 2004, 69% wanted Rowland to resign while 57% wanted him impeached (Matt Apuzzo, "55 Percent Say Rowland Should Resign" December 17, 2003; "Poll Says Majority of Connecticut Voters Want Rowland to Resign," June 3, 2004, both *Associated Press State and Local Wire (Connecticut)*, LexisNexis Academic database).